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Abstract
A concept of life as an emergent property, originating from the interaction of two
specific interpretations of biological individuality and entropy, will be discussed
in this thesis. Biological individuality will be shown to be a specific member of
the category of individuality and a notion best interpreted as a relative concept
which is hierarchically structured by interrelated nested entities. A specific in-
terpretation of entropy will described as a statistical notion in which entropy is
able to locally increase order as a stable dynamic kinetic state in a closed sys-
tem. The rise of complex organization will be something that can be explained
scientifically but is interpreted as a predominant emergentist property. In this
thesis I argue that life emerges as a property rising from within the organization
of a compartmentalized entity that is able to locally decrease its entropy due
to a self-replicating autocatalytic web that jumped into existence. Biological
individuality and entropy both relate to a base level of complexity and start to
meet at the lowest level of organization. I argue that living biological individu-
als are not substrate neutral implying life in silico will always be fundamentally
different from biological life.
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Introduction
The biological world is something to wonder about. Life is something to wonder
about. Here that wonder will be analysed and discussed. The driving force
behind this thesis is the question “What is life?”. It would be presumptuous
to assume this question could be answered in this thesis and that won’t be
attempted. Instead, the main aim of this thesis is to add a descriptive concept
of life that is based on a emergentist view of organization within living biological
individuals. In this introduction the living world will be viewed from a distant
perspective to get an idea about its characteristics. Then, two views will be
briefly introduced that will help in conceptualizing life and the storyline of the
thesis is given.
Characteristics of Life
In our daily experience we are able to recognize manifestations of life without
much effort, because it is readily available and because of its subtle charac-
teristics. One of the characteristics of life one may be easily surprised about
is its complexity. Even the simplest life forms show a remarkable high degree
of organization, operating with great accuracy on a scale of nanometers. The
accuracy with which specimens make up their life may seem almost impossible
to attain without some degree of foresight. Observing any sample taken from
the living world one will inevitably come across nature’s impeccable “design”
capabilities. Of course it’s known that nature can be extremely creative without
the need of an intelligent designer or a supernatural force. In fact, the creativity
nature produces is everything but intelligent and nothing gets built for a specific
purpose. Nature doesn’t work in a goal-oriented way nor does it try to fulfil a
detailed plan.
Not only is the complexity of life striking, so is its diversity. The number of
individual forms is very large. The world contains a wide variety of living things
we know plenty about, many others about which we hardly know anything, and
still others we have yet to discover. Living things occupy the land and the sky
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as well as the seas, with specimens as big as fire engines or so small they can
hardly be seen with microscopes. All these different individual specimens con-
tinually come into existence and perish almost at the same time, maintaining
its diversity and keeping it highly dynamic.
The availability of individuals makes it relatively easy to start observing living
things. Without the need for instruments we can already see many specimens
having their own natural agenda. It is such a profound characteristic of life
which even toddlers can identify. Although this agenda isn’t working towards
anything in particular, it does show life has a broad directionality. In fact,
this facet of most complex living things is so evident that biologists came up
with a special term to address this - teleonomy. Teleonomy is nature’s teleology
without a well-defined telos, therefore lacking any guiding foresight. Because of
this absence the term is used to refer to patterns of behaviour such as hunting
prey, protecting the young, building shelter, mating and reproduction, etc. This
teleonomic character of life is helpful to us for understanding the activity of
many biological individuals that constitute the biological world.
Interpreting the Living World
The concept of life has been much debated and a large effort has been put into
trying to define life. Some have argued that a definition of life is not helpful
or necessary because life is an irreducible fact of nature. Other definitions have
followed the line of Descartes’ dualism and have viewed life as a mechanism,
but this reduction has met a lot of criticism [1][2]. Other attempts have fo-
cused on life as organization [3] but failed to explain the complexity of living
things. Interpreting organization as (bio)chemical patterns led to the belief
that such patterns had special properties [4][1] such as a living systems’ ability
to metabolize, grow, or repair. Current thoughts about life often focus on its
being a process and not a substance and this tends to make definitions more
descriptive. The number of different “descriptive” definitions of life is high and
each description has most probably been fruitful for the author putting it for-
ward. A common strategy to define life is by listing physiological properties
all living things must share. An individual specimen that has all properties
is then said to be alive. Physiological properties of life often include adapta-
tion, growth, homeostasis, metabolism, reproduction, and response to stimuli
[5][6][7][8][9][10][11]. This strategy will not work because there will always exist
living biological things that do not have all properties. For example, a mule is
a living thing but sterile and therefore cannot reproduce. In this thesis life will
also be conceptualized in a descriptive manner with a focus on its organization
and the properties it has. A mechanistic interpretation of life is purely reduc-
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tionistic whilst an organizational view leaves open the possibility of emergent
properties as part of the description. This is why, in this thesis, reductionism
alone isn’t taken to be sufficient to give a description of life that fits with current
thought.
Observing patterns is a method to gather information and gain knowledge
about biological systems. The upside of observing behavioural and some mor-
phological patterns is that it can be done from far away, making gathering
information and gaining knowledge relatively easy. The downside, however, is
that observing such patterns of a living thing will not tell you what makes
the living thing actually alive. Observing chemical pattern is also necessary to
understand biological systems. To find out what makes a living thing “tick”
scientist moved their focus from the point of observation outside the biologi-
cal individual to a perspective within its physical boundaries. Even though no
“elan vital” or “spark of life” is thought to exist these days [12][13], observ-
ing and recognizing patterns on a smaller scale has tremendously extended our
knowledge of the biological world. Recognizing patterns instantiates explana-
tory power and often the patterns observed on a large scale can be explained by
patterns observed on a small(er) scale. Due to the success of this reductionist
approach in science it’s no wonder an answer to the problematic phenomenon
of life that some have tried to formulate is approached in the same way as many
other complex problems. The question “what is life?” has become, besides a
philosophical issue, a scientific one and resides within the domain of not only
biology but chemistry and physics as well. Looking on the inside of living things
has vastly extended our knowledge about what life “does” but the answer to
what life “is” is still not clear. Progress within the sciences that study life have
produced many insights contributing to our understanding of living systems but
a truly satisfying answer to the question “what is life?” remains out of reach.
Because of this, doubts are raised whether a complete answer to the question of
what life is can be found by a purely reductionist interpretation (if at all). Part
of the answer may rely on an emergentist view of life.
One of the reasons for involving an emergentist view besides a reductionist
one is that life is easily distinguishable on the scale of a whole system, but
isn’t necessarily understood best as the mere sum of its parts. Describing the
phenomenon of life depends, to a large degree, on the level of observation.
The same goes for the concept of biological individuality although there is a
slight difference. If one observes one and the same biological individual it could
be possible, depending on the specimen chosen, that the parts of which the
individual consists are, in a way, biological individuals as well. A dog, for
example, a textbook example of a biological individual, is built from many
different cells and although each cell isn’t an individual dog it is possible to
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categorize such cells as biological individuals too. To keep things simple for
now, if we were to use specific criteria that enable us to characterize a dog as
an individual thing then the same criteria could characterize one of its cells as
an individual.1 These are criteria such as: spatial and temporal boundedness,
the ability to adapt, clear life cycle, suffering from impaired function if some
of its parts were to be removed. The criteria listed here, in this oversimplified
example, can be used to pin down what an individual dog is and would single
out a dog cell as well. The difference is that a (whole) living thing can somehow
be made up of smaller non-living entities (or parts) whilst a (whole) biological
individual can be built from smaller biological individuals (or parts).
Depending on both the observer and the level at which the observer actually
observes, his/her language, used to describe patterns, may vary. Problems may
arise due to ambiguous terms, equivocation, or anthropomorphic language. I
want to stress this briefly because if a term, such as “emergent behaviour”, is
used by A without a proper detailed explanation, person B might interpret this
as something mystical or unexplainable. Also, in order to help visualize complex
processes specific patterns are sometimes easily described by attributing mental
capacities to its components without those components actually having such
capacities.
Research Questions and Storyline
In order to build a notion of life two principles for direction are used in this
thesis. First, to get a sense of what life is examples are chosen that are thought
of as being living things. This domain will be covered by describing biologi-
cal individuality. Second, to understand what makes living things alive it is
valuable to understand how they are organized. In this thesis organization is
interpreted as the interactions between parts at specific levels of observation.
Here, unpredictability, stability, and most importantly entropy will be of key
importance.
The main question of this thesis is: ‘How to create a concept of life as an
emergent property which originates from the interplay between biological indi-
viduality and entropy?’. Maybe scientist believe that such an inquiry belongs
to the task of the philosopher. On the other hand, a philosopher might find
the inquiry too scientific. The reason to focus on biological individuality and
entropy is to try and close the gap a little more between philosophy and science
regarding the topic of life.
Two subquestions are put forward in this thesis and build on the two pre-
cepts above. The first subquestion is: How to construct an interpretation of
1This does not hold anymore if specific criteria are whole-organism-level criteria. A way
to characterize large organism is discussed in chapter 2.
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biological individuality that is on a par with the domains in which the scientific
community studies living things? With ‘on a par’ I mean that an interpretation
of biological individuality needs to correspond with different scales at which
biological research is conducted. It will be shown that such an interpretation
should take a hierarchical structure of the biological world into account. The
second subquestion is: How to construct a scientific relevant interpretation of
entropy that doesn’t contradict the description of a biological individual? In
other words, can entropy be described so that it can have a realistic presence
inside living things without the notion of entropy contradicting the interpreta-
tion of biological individuality? The general idea is to form a basis with two
specific notions, that of biological individuality and entropy, from which it is
reasonable to assume that both biological individuals and entropy are needed
for emergent properties to arise that help conceptualize life.
In chapter 1 individuals of any form and/or kind are discussed. The reason
for addressing this broader concept of “individuality” instead of “biological in-
dividuality” originates from the claim that there can be a specific subset of
individuals labelled “biological”. A distinction is made between non-living and
living individuals as well as natural kinds. In section 1.4 “Nature of Nature” a
small sidestep is made towards intrinsic properties of matter and how it limits
interaction. It will become clear throughout chapter 1 why certain individuals
are hard to define and why they are special members of the individuality cate-
gory.
In chapter 2 the subset of biological individuals is discussed. The chapter argues
that biological individuality is a relative concept and endorses pluralism about
the concept. Nevertheless, some conceptualizations more accurately depict the
hierarchy of the biological world and this is done by introducing two (sub)classes
of biological things: Darwinian individuals and organisms. The chapter ends
with an interpretation of biological individuality as a multiplicity of nested enti-
ties. Levels of organization and relations between nesting biological individuals
are argued to be of key importance.
Chapter 3 will discuss notions of entropy. Various physical concepts will be
introduced and explained including dynamic stability, compartmentalization,
percolation threshold, and autocatalysis. Near the end, this chapter will discuss
the basis necessary to understand the relation between biological individuality
and entropy. This relationship is shown to be highly dependent on the organi-
zational structure of (pre-)biological things.
Chapter 4 will address the concept of life as an emergent property originating
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from the interplay between biological individuality and entropy on particular
levels of organization. Additionally, artificial life will be discussed and taken to
be a special case, but not a paradigmatic example, of life and distinct from any
biological living thing but with clear parallels. This chapter will argue against
substrate-neutrality and therefore for authenticity of living things.
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Chapter 1
Individuality
What do we mean when we talk about individuality? Does it have to do with
distinctiveness, identity, unity, or uniqueness perhaps? Yes, would be an appro-
priate answer to that question since all those terms refer to the same intuitive
feeling of what it must be like to be an individual. The quality one needs to
possess in order to be characterized as being an individual but what, then, do
we mean if we label something as being an individual? Arguably we label “per-
sons” as being individuals, or an individual could be constructed as a being
that is separate from other beings, that may hold certain beliefs and desires,
and strives for particular goals. Still, this generalization is too narrow for many
entities exemplifying individual things. Although persons are great examples of
individuals they cannot define “individuality”. Specific objects are instances of
individual things as well even though beliefs, desires, and goals aren’t part of
the description.
In order to move forward a definition of individuality is given in this chapter,
taken from Thomas Pradeu’s “Immunity and the Emergence of Individuality”
[14]. In this chapter each criterion of Pradeu’s definition will be put to the test
by taking borderline cases of individual things that intuitively feel as individuals
but are not accurately captured by some of the criteria in Pradeu’s definition.
The idea behind this is not to show that Pradeu’s definition holds no value,
because it is possible to make a strong case for his requirements, but rather
to show that even with strong criteria it’s hard to provide an all-satisfying
definition.
There is no universally accepted definition of the notion of individuality, but
a preliminary one is chosen: “An individual in general is an entity that can be
designated through a demonstrative reference (this F), is separable, countable,
has acceptably clear-cut spatial boundaries, and exhibits transtemporal iden-
tity.” [14, p.78]. In general this is a definition capable of capturing a large part
of the living and non-living world. However, the seemingly endless variety of
7
things always tends to include an exception. The reason for choosing Pradeu’s
definition opposed to other definitions (of which some will be introduced below)
is because it allows us to interpret biological individuals as a subset of individu-
ality. In the next chapter part of the critique of his definition is used to illustrate
that biological individuals not necessarily include only living things. This will
be discussed chapter 2 but first, problems with this definition of Pradeu are
discussed.
1.1 Separate Individuals
The image of a tree as a singular thing consisting of roots, a trunk, supporting
branches, and leaves is, in some cases, not adequate. For example, Aspen trees,
or Populus tremula, look like separate1 trees but actually form a network of
contiguous parts. The trees are all connected underground by multicellular
runners which are send out by each tree from their root stocks. These runners
fuse underground and also grow upwards to the light forming new trees. Each
tree uses their root structure to share nutrients and other resources among other
Aspen trees connected to the underground structure [15, p.31]. The connected
Aspen trees form a very large and single grove. If “connected” Aspen trees
are considered individual things the condition of “separateness” doesn’t hold.
An even messier example of connectedness and therefore lack of separateness is
that of a giant fungus, Armillaria solidipes. Like the Aspen trees the fungus
grows and spreads underground and, unlike the Aspen trees, the bulk primarily
lives underneath the surface. One specimen, found in Malheur National Forest
in Oregon, covers an area of nearly 10 square kilometers. The fungus will
grow “honey mushrooms” in the autumn, the only (direct) visible part of this
“Humongous Fungus”. Where it is doable to count single Aspen trees as parts
of one single grove or mushrooms of fungus it is considerably harder to count
parts of fungus belonging to one single specimen because it is not clear where one
part stops and another part ends. A step in the right direction might be Ellen
Clarke’s advice to pay more attention to critical functional roles in biological
individuals, such as (self-)policing and demarcation functions [16]. A little more
on functionality will be discussed in the next chapter.
1.2 Bounded Individuals
Separateness strongly depends on the boundary of things, there where you ob-
serve a boundary one thing stops and another (or nothing) begins. A bowling
ball is separated from other bowling balls due to its boundary made up by its
1I take ‘separable’ to display a disposition of ‘separate’ things and consequently test things
for displaying ‘separateness’.
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hard cover, preventing it to merge with other bowling balls and remaining no-
ticeably distinct from the air around it. The boundary at macro-scale seems
clear but can only be defined precisely on a micro-scale. For example, human
skin functions as a boundary, but what exactly is skin and, more importantly,
where does it “end”? Basically, it consists of three layers of tissue with the
upper layer (epidermis) forming the final boundary. This upper layer of tissue,
however, is made from cells. So whenever one wants to locate the boundary
more precisely one has to keep zooming in. Unfortunately, establishing an exact
boundary is not an easy matter, if possible at all. The answer to the question
“Where does the boundary lie?” depends on the satisfaction or acceptance of the
observer. But such acceptance is (highly) subjective. If one wants to know the
boundary it should be independent of the observer’s idiosyncratic satisfaction.
At the cellular level a cell’s membrane functions as a spatial boundary sep-
arating the internal organization from the external environment, but now the
boundary isn’t just some passive boundary anymore. Instead, it interacts with
its environment. If we zoom in on cell surface receptors, the boundary of three
entities will be observable before interaction. These are the boundaries of the
membrane-domain of the cell, the receptor of the cell and of an extracellular
molecule that is able to bind to the receptor (nutrients, neurotransmitters, hor-
mones, etc). Now, if we take a snapshot in time some may be occupied and
others may not. When viewing the snapshot, we could argue that for that spe-
cific point in time the molecules occupying the receptors belong to or, more
accurately, are “part of” the cell. If we turn time back on again there will be an
average occupancy of receptors but then we wouldn’t feel as compelled to argue
that the average occupancy is part of the cell too. The dynamic aspect of the
cell causes problems. To make things a little more realistic (and complicated);
some molecules are not the right kind of molecules to bind to receptors but
instead move past them and diffuse from the outside environment through the
membrane and into the cell. Other molecules cross the boundary in the other
direction and move out and away from the cell. Compounds outside the cell are
no longer part of or connected to the whole but the cell itself remains one and
the same thing.
1.2.1 Level of Observation
If we discuss the notion of boundedness and describe a process occurring at the
sub-cellular level it’s erroneous to compare it with observations at the cellular
level. If we allow continuous switching of levels of observation it becomes im-
possible to make a valid statement of separateness, or singular things. Trying
to find the exact location at which the boundary lies one can zoom in a little
further, beyond the sub-cellular to the atomic scale but here boundaries dis-
appear completely. Due to the rapid interactions between atoms it’s next to
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impossible to see what atom “belongs to” or is “part of” which individual thing
(unless we freeze time). Interacting atoms do a little dance with one another
and then move to another partner and repeat this over and over again until the
end of time. It’s no use to try and figure out what particular atoms make up a
larger-scale individual for all the atoms making up that one singular thing don’t
tend to stay in the same place in space. For this reason atoms can’t be said
to “belong to” or be addressed as “part of” anyone or anything, rendering the
concept of a boundary meaningless.
The examples above show that it’s rather hard to state that this F is a
separable, countable entity with clear-cut boundaries unless the location of the
boundary is left imprecise. If we now look at Pradeu’s preliminary definition,
given earlier, we have to conclude that thus far the conditions fall short or are
subjective.
1.3 Discrete Individuals
Most, if not all individual non-living things may be grouped together, portray
a sort of “kindhood”, and come in a variety of shapes and sizes, prevalent at
different levels of observation.
Going from astronomically large to atomically small we’re able to observe
galaxies, solar systems, stars and planets, continents, countries, cities, buildings,
rooms, tables, rocks, molecules, atoms, quarks etc. Notice that the examples are
instances of real objects and not concepts such as “whiteness” or “pressured”.2
It should come as no surprise that larger systems may consist of smaller ones
that are not miniature versions of the larger assembly but different individual
parts on their own.
Living things and non-living things are built from the same elementary par-
ticles that make up the matter in our universe. These small entities can be
distinguished by their different intrinsic properties making up different kinds.
(The ones that share the same intrinsic properties belong to the same kind.)
The identity of these entities is independent of time, in other words, taking it
out of existence and recreating it again will yield the same entity.
For example, if one of these entities, a gold atom, is taken out of existence
together with all those entities sharing the exact same intrinsic properties, i.e.
all other gold atoms, no other atom is able to take its place in the periodic table.
This is because all other atoms have different intrinsic properties compared to
2It can be argued pressure is considered a real quantity in science. In this paragraph the
focus lies on observable entities, but this also is troublesome when instruments are needed
and entities are not “directly” observed. Theories about an entity’s characteristics let us
believe certain properties are measurable from which we infer its existence [17]. When moving
towards scientific domains it is unavoidable to move further without the additional burden of
the problems of scientific realism.
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gold atoms. In the periodic table gold has atomic number 79 and fills a spot
between platinum (with atomic number 78), and mercury (atomic number 80).
There are no intermediate levels between platinum and gold or gold and mercury
because no atoms exist with 78.5 or 79.3 protons. Likewise no atoms exist with
78.5 or 79.3 electrons. There is no continuous transition from platinum to gold
or from gold to mercury. This imposes limits on the possible ways atoms can
interact and I will argue the importance of this in chapter 4. If gold is taken out
of existence there will occur a gap in the transition from platinum to mercury.
That gap functions as a hole which can be potentially filled by an atom with 79
protons if it were created.
Theoretically the transformation from platinum to gold is made if a proton
and a neutron are added to the core of a platinum atom and if one electron
gets added to its second most outer shell. For mercury one proton and two
neutrons will have to be taken out of the core and the most outer shell needs to
be stripped of one electron. If such an atom is created, the exact same element
gold will reappear. Exactly one atom can occupy the gap or “slot” between
platinum and mercury, not a tiny bit more and not slightly less but precisely
one. The fact that there is one and not an infinite number of slots in between
platinum and mercury is a consequence of the fabric of nature.
1.4 Nature of Nature
There is a clear borderline between atoms that we can draw due to the discrete
transition from one atom to another, as explained above. This makes atoms
categorically distinct. Also, all gold atoms are members of the same “kind”
of atom (because they all share the same intrinsic properties) and all mercury
atoms are members of a different “kind” and both participate in the laws of
nature [18]. Therefore, atoms can be said to be examples of “natural kinds”.
Atoms of gold and atoms of mercury are built in distinct ways and although
they obey the laws of nature, the way in which the gold and mercury atoms
interact with other matter differs.
In this view the number of ways to create new (stable) things is not limitless.
It is only possible to fill the “slots” the fabric of nature has installed and because
of this constraint the number of possibilities for creation is limited. Atoms are
are able to occupy the slots and belong to a specific natural kind which means
that they will have the same intrinsic properties before they’re taken out and
after they come back into existence. This does not hold for animate matter.
For example, each cell is unique, as is every aggregate structure of cells and
when taken out of existence that unique thing has ceased to exist. Creating a
new cell-like entity will yield a different individual thing for it does not occupy
a “slot” in the fabric of nature.
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1.5 Changing Individuals
The elementary particles that build matter seem to be relatively stable in time
but living things, whether they are small, large, or collectives tend to perish
or adapt. The (evolutionary) timescale over which living things change can be
extremely long (ca. millions to billions of years, depending on the specimen(s))
[19]. Still this is relatively short compared to the longest timeline known to
mankind; that is the estimated origin of the universe until now (ca. 13 billion
years) [20].
Evolution depicts change and every living thing studied in an evolutionary
timewindow will therefore not exhibit a transtemporal identity. Only under
certain time restrictions does it make sense to speak of Pradeu’s criterion of
transtemporal identity and such a restriction will vary from living thing to
living thing. Compared to an evolutionary trajectory a transtemporal identity
will only be exhibited when a living thing is observed in a relative short period
of time.
An evolutionary trajectory accounts for multiple generations and not the
lifespan of one and the same specimen [21]. Therefore, the lifespan of a sin-
gle specimen is mostly relatively short compared to its evolutionary trajectory.
So with regard to that time line a single specimen could be said to display
transtemporal identity but this statement becomes flawed because of an unbal-
anced comparison of timescales. To illustrate this consider a common fruit fly,
e.g. Drosophila melanogaster, being observed for 24 hours. Although the fly
will “look” the same after 24 hours all the metabolic processes going on inside
the fruit fly have changed the original body of the fly. The metabolic processes
itself could be argued to be the same, and maybe the genetic make up of the fly
(although some cells will carry some mutations). The only way to observe the
fly while it’s not changing is by looking at it in a time frame where all intra-
cellular interactions seem to have come to a (complete) stop. This can only be
done if time is frozen but then the term “transtemporal” doesn’t seem to mean
much anymore.
There is one way to save the claim of transtemporal identity for living things
but it is a weak claim especially compared to the transtemporal identity for non-
living individuals. Both living and non-living systems are able to persist in time
but they do so in quite different manners. Non-living systems tend to uphold a
static stability which enables them to endure time while living systems maintain
a dynamic stability to withstand the ticking of the clock.
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1.6 Recapitulation
Individuality is a notion that is hard to define. Even a relatively strong defini-
tion, taken from Pradeu, has criteria that tend to exclude certain individuals.
There exist borderline cases, such as Aspen trees and fungus, that show that the
criterion of separateness is problematic due to their connected characteristics.
A boundary generally separates one thing from another but locating the
boundary was shown to be troublesome. Different levels of observation are
necessary to locate a boundary more precisely. However, scaling too far down
will render the concept of a boundary meaningless or a boundary will depend on
an observer’s personal satisfaction and therefore becomes an subjective notion.
Individuals persist through time, but those that can be characterized as
natural kinds do so in a different way compared to others. Non-living things
were argued to persist through time by being statically stable. Living things,
on the other hand, were argued to persist through time by being dynamically
stable and therefore do not stay the same. This led to the idea that the crite-
rion of transtemporal identity doesn’t fit either living or non-living individual
particularly well.
Some criteria of Pradeu’s definition either fall short or rely on the observer’s
satisfaction. This critique will be shown to have an effect of his definition of “bi-
ological individuality” too. The next chapter sets out to construct an idea what
the subset “biological” within the set of individuals means and how to construct
a notion of biological individuality that matches the hierarchical structure of the
biological world. Also, the term “living thing” instead of “biological individual”
has been used and for a particular reason: although there is overlap between
the two I will argue that they are not necessarily identical to one another.
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Chapter 2
Biological Individual
Intuitively it feels as if every biological individual is a form of life. This chapter
argues that this is important, because when we try to create a concept of life
as an emergent property which originates from the interplay between biological
individuality and entropy, we do not take “biological individuality” to equal
“life”. The main aim of this chapter, however, is to answer the question whether
it is possible to construct an interpretation of biological individuality that fits
with the different scales at which scientists observe biological things.
The biological world is often equated with the living world, but despite many
similarities those two worlds are not identical. I will argue that the biological
world spans a space wider than that of the living world because it encapsulates
domains below the smallest living thing as well as domains far greater than col-
lectives of living things. Without instruments we are able to observe the richness
of life around us and can easily see cats, flocks of birds, fish, and roses. And if
we take a closer look we might see ants, fruit flies, or spores. With instruments
we can take a look at a whole new world that lies hidden at small scales far
beyond our normal visual capacities. With the help of technical devices we can
detect single cells, chromosomes, RNA-strands, and genes. Although not every
entity listed above would be characterized as a living thing they are all suitable
for representing some kind of biological individual and each one has probably
been used as an example as such at some time in the natural science of biol-
ogy. Biologists recognize many different biological individuals in attempts to
better understand, predict, and explain the biological world. These biological
individuals can be found on a wide scale-spectrum. This means biologists study
biological individuals at the molecular level (genes) all the way up to near astro-
nomical sizes (biosphere). The domains of scientific research regarding biology
tend to match1 the hierarchical structure of the biological world relatively well.
1From a standpoint of scientific realism “match” is a fitting word, however, philosophi-
cal objections to this standpoint could argue that the biologists “make” such a hierarchical
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In this chapter first the preliminary definition of Pradeu will be rediscussed.
This time the requirements of his definition are used to look at a difference
between the concepts of biological individual and living thing. In addition to
this discussion the action of defining biological individuality will be argued to
be relative. Because some ideas about biological individuality capture the hier-
archical structure of the biological world better than others the second part of
this chapter deals with two (sub)classes of biological things (because not all are
necessarily alive): Darwinian individuals and organisms.
In section 2.3 the relative interpretation of a biological individual is shown
to lead to a view of a multiplicity of biological individuality. This idea is fur-
ther illustrated by introducing the phenomena of vertical nesting and horizontal
nesting. Lastly, implications of the inherent hierarchy of nested individuals are
addressed which have to do with their levels of organization. An interpretation
of biological individuality that takes into account the hierarchical structure of
the biological world is claimed to stand close to domains of current scientific
research.
But let’s start with an earlier specific perspective on biological individuality
, a preliminary definition from Pradeu.
2.1 Defining Biological Individuality
In the previous chapter we worked with a preliminary definition of individuality
listing several requirements (an entity that has demonstrable reference, is count-
able, bounded and exhibits a transtemporal identity) as to what it must take
to be classified as an individual. According to Pradeu a biological individual is
a living thing that fulfills those requirements [14, p.79]. However, there are
three main reasons why this does not work. The first reason has to do with the
nature of Pradeu’s requirements. The second reason deals with entities fulfilling
the requirements without belonging to the “living world”, and the third reason
focuses on the difference between describing and defining.
First, as described in the previous chapter the notions of separateness, clear-
cut boundaries, being countable, and transtemporal identity are not tenable (at
least not for every biological entity). The last part of the sentence is in between
brackets because establishing boundaries is hard when shifting levels of obser-
vation regardless of what the boundaries “belong to” or demarcate. Even if no
levels of observation are shifted there will remain examples of biological individ-
uals that won’t fulfill the requirements listed by Pradeu. The grove of Aspen
trees and Humongous Fungus fall short due to their “connectedness” character-
structure.
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istic instead of their “separateness”. Another striking example is an uncommon
jellyfish: the Portuguese man o’ war, or Physalia physalis. (Actually, Physalia
physalis is a “siphonophore” but it looks very much like a jellyfish). The Por-
tuguese man o’ war consists of several societies of specialized cell colonies each
belonging to an originally different specialized cell, or zooid. Four zooids even-
tually “built” the jellyfish and are mutually dependent on one another. They
can survive only together and form a physiologically integrated whole. Although
the Portuguese man o’ war starts of as one single zooid it relies on other zooids
for its final stage. A fully developed Man o’ war has boundaries which are not
necessarily clear-cut and, besides that, it exists primarily due to “connected”
colonies of different zooids.
Second, Pradeu’s requirements may characterize an entity that is not a liv-
ing thing but nonetheless a biological individual. This is problematic, because
Pradeu formulates a biological individual as a “living” thing that satisfies his
criteria of individuality. A bacterium frozen at -80 degrees Celsius, as stock for
research, is an example of a biological individual without being in a state that
can be described as being alive. All (sub)cellular processes are put to a stop
making it not a viable entity and therefore not a clear case of a living thing.
However, one might argue that the bacterium’s decay is extremely slowed down
making it only seem as if life has stopped, while it has only paused.2 A virus
raises the same problem in determining whether or not it is a living thing not
for slowed down cellular processes, but for lacking them all together. Since
viruses don’t have their own metabolic processes nor the ability to reproduce
autonomously they rely on the cellular machinery of their host to do so. This
troubling case arguably isn’t a living thing but is in fact a biological individual.
And then there are genes, clear instances of non-living things, but according to
Pradeu biological individuals nonetheless.
In addition to this second argument two other entities display a lack of
livelihood but have been argued to be examples of biological individuals. The
first of these two entities is a species. It was argued by Hull that a concept
of species should not be taken to be something that contains a set of intrinsic
natural properties that are all necessary and jointly sufficient for the entity to
belong to the particular species-kind. It was argued by Ghiselin and Hull that
species are individuals due to their role as units of evolution in evolutionary
theory [22][23]. Although there are other ways to conceptualize species, such as
clusters [24] or sets [25], the notion of species as individuals holds a particular
valuable implication: it is a biological individual but not a living thing. There-
fore, it ways against Pradeu’s definition. The second entity is a superorganism
2A frozen bacterium does not grow, metabolize, react to stimuli, actively performs home-
ostasis, or evolves but once the temperature rises it could.
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which is somewhat similar to the Portuguese man o’ war but instead of being
built from multiple colonies of cells it consist of multiple organisms. Contrary
to the jellyfish these individual organisms can be quite similar but do need one
another for their survival. They rely heavily on their specialised division of
labour. Beehives and ant colonies are examples of such superorganisms often
interpreted as a single individual and biological thing. This is a problem for
Pradeu’s definition because such organisms have been argued to be biological
individuals without being alive.
Third, stating what a biological individual is can best be done by giving a de-
scription of its properties while giving a definition of “biological individuality”
relies on a short3 explanation of its meaning. Usually a description of some-
thing is a detailed conceptualization of the thing’s characteristics and functions
quite well as background information for the thing’s definition. What I mean
by this is that a definition tends to be more strict compared to a description.
For example, a definition of a mouse will not vary much around the world and
most likely state that it is a rodent belonging to a certain family and genus. A
description of a mouse, on the other hand, may vary greatly. It should be noted
that there’s a difference between describing and defining. The biggest differ-
ence may be that philosophers and biologists will, most likely, have no dispute
about a description of biological individuality (whatever specimen taken) but
this generally doesn’t hold for defining biological individuality.
Coming up with a definition of “biological individuality” has not been trouble-
some for philosophers and biologists. However, formulating a definition that is
accepted by all philosophers and biologists hasn’t been done so far [26]. Part of
the reason is the language used to address biological entities where “biological
individual”, “living thing”, and “organism” are often used interchangeably. So
far, the term “organism” has been used only few times in order to minimize con-
ceptual vagueness of the term and relational imprecision between “organism”
and the two other terms, “biological individual” and “living thing”. To prevent
obscurity these concepts will be categorized below, but it should be noted that
that categorization is not the only possible one.
A second reason why defining biological individuality may be troublesome is
that, so far, there have always existed counterexamples in the biological world
against current definitions. Coming up with a refined definition has, so far,
always led to the same problem. Adding to that, particular definitions suit some
biologists well because those definitions happen to correspond to their (current)
work better.4 In general biological individuals are just whatever biologists find
3Although a definition does not require to be “short” it may be more convenient than a
definition taking up numerous pages.
4Definitions in any field need to be usable for researchers working in that field.
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useful to talk about. This suggests that there simply are whatever many kinds
of biological individuals are recognized by competent biologists [25] [27]. This
implies that attempts to define “biological individuality” is dependent upon the
observer’s perspective5 and therefore I move to endorse a form of pluralism
[8][28]. Depending on ones perspective different intuitive understandings may
arise which can be hard to formalize.
Nevertheless, it is possible to categorize definitions about biological individ-
uality into three sets: a biological individual as 1) the level at which fitness is
assigned or 2) the level at which selection is acting or 3) the level at which a
response to selection can occur. This categorization is taken from Goodnight
[29]. The first class depicts a clear example of being a construct made only for
the usefulness of the observer. The second and third class of definitions also
put the focus on evolutionary forces acting on the biological individual either
by natural selection or evolution by natural selection, respectively [29, p.48].
In most cases, practical constraints or focus of study will force a definition of
biological individuality in either one of these categories. It should be noted that,
despite this relativistic note, some ideas about biological individuality are more
fruitful than others.
2.2 Darwinian individuals and Organisms
Our understanding of the biological world is that it’s highly diverse and hi-
erarchically organized with generally ‘species composed of populations6, pop-
ulations of individuals, individuals of cells7, cells of organelles, organelles of
genomes, genomes of chromosomes, and chromosomes of genes’ [30, p.183]. A
description of biological individuality that aims to be complementary with our
recent understanding of the biological world needs to capture such a hierarchical
structure. In the categorization that follows the set of biological individuals is
the overarching collection of entities which is subdivided into two overlapping
categories: Darwinian individuals and organisms. This is no new idea and has
already been argued for by Peter Godfrey-Smith in his 2014 essay, Individuality
5Biologist seem to capture biological individuals on macroscopic scales up to superorgan-
isms but not higher than that. In the same manner biologist do not seem to characterize
biological individuals below the genetic level. Why is that? Because at very large scales the
individual doesn’t seem to play a role anymore in its organization relative to its smaller parts.
At lower levels the descriptions of the trajectory of elementary particles, for example, does
not contribute to a clearer understanding of gene activity or influences on any other biological
individual for that matter. Levels of observation are used at which biologists can best capture
patterns and observe the things that seem relevant to their research of the biological world.
6Species can also be argued to be composed of large groups of organisms or by individuals
that show similar physical attributes. However, here the focus on a hierarchical structure is
what is important.
7Buss may have had trouble placing viruses, because viruses are not composed of cells.
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and Life Cycles [31]. Although Godfrey-Smith doesn’t use the term “biological
individuals” for the adjunction of the two sets, which I take over, I do use that
term in this thesis, because I believe it provides an opportunity to cover the
entire biological world more clearly.
Figure 2.1: Venn diagram of the set of Darwinian individuals (sections 1+2)
and the set of organisms (sections 2+3). Biological individuals = (Darwinian
individuals) ∪ (Organisms).
The best-known formulations of Darwinian in Darwinian individuals have been
put forward by Richard Lewontin [32][33]. Darwin’s theory of evolution by natu-
ral selection is contained in three principles: variation, heredity, and differential
fitness. Entities or collections of entities of which the three principles apply
may be expected to evolve. Simply put: ‘Variation, heredity, and difference in
reproductive success are the features of populations that give rise to Darwinian
change. Any collection that has these features can be called a Darwinian popu-
lation, and any member of such a collection is a Darwinian individual ’ [27, p.19].
Godfrey-Smith’s interpretation of organisms is not tied to the theory of evo-
lution but specified as metabolic units. According to this view ‘organisms are
systems comprised of diverse parts which work together to maintain the sys-
tem’s structure, despite turnover material, by making use of sources of energy
and other resources from their environment’ [27, p.25]. Part of the elegance of
this characterization of organisms is that it doesn’t necessarily depicts living
things but it can contain large non-living collections of organisms as well, such
as superorganisms.
Examples of Darwinian individuals that belong in section 1 in figure2.1 are
genes and viruses. Note that these entities are non-living things. Mules and
symbiotic bacteria are categorized as organisms that fit in section 3 of figure2.1.
The intersection of Darwinian individuals and organisms, depicted by section 2
in figure2.1, contains biological individuals such as trees and dogs (which relate
more to textbook examples of biological individuals).
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Both Darwinian individuals and organisms are viewed in a gradient way em-
bodying both the clear and more marginal specimens. The gradualness in Dar-
winian individuals originates from the fact that they are biological things that
can “reproduce”. Reproductive success is basically a relative interpretation of
the number of newly produced Darwinian individuals, or offspring, originating
from their parents. In some cases new individuals are reproduced not by means
of parents but by being reproduced by “themselves” instead, e.g. cellular re-
production or the reproduction of viruses. In this chapter I recognize three
different types of reproducers: elementary, aggregate, and indirect reproducers.
Examples of elementary reproducers are bacteria or other unicellular Darwinian
individuals that use their own internal processes to make more entities like them-
selves. Aggregate reproducers are multicellular Darwinian individuals that rely
on interactions across levels of multiple cells to reproduce offspring such as dogs
and human beings. Examples of indirect reproducers are genes and viruses
which rely on either elementary or aggregate reproducers to finally “replicate”
themselves. (The concept of reproduction might be more suitable for living bi-
ological things and that of replication for non-living biological things such as
genes and chromosomes.)
It is possible for evolution to gradually give rise to new types of Darwinian
individuals as a Darwinian population evolves. What is meant with new indi-
viduals in this case is the rise of aggregate reproducers from elementary ones.
When complex biological individuals like swans or giraffes exist, their cells still
reproduce themselves (and vary due to mutations along the way). But these
cells, that gave rise to a new Darwinian individual, have their own evolutionary
activities standing in the shadow of the evolutionary trajectory of the new indi-
vidual they make up. Due to aggregate reproduction cells rely on collaborative
organisation to persist through time. Optimizing collaboration and reducing
conflict amongst cells within a multicellular individual enhance the reproduc-
tive success and hence the persistence through time of both the (old) elementary
reproducers and the (newly formed) aggregate reproducers. This optimization
is the result of evolution and a gradual process. This is responsible for both the
gradualness in Darwinian individuals as well as degrees of organismality.89
The categories, Darwinian individuals and organisms, are able to capture
the entire biological world in an unambiguous fashion, containing the smallest
biological individuals in the Darwinian category up to the largest in the organism
8‘Significant metabolic integration at level n implies a lower integration of the objects at
level n− 1. More generally, a high degree of organismality at one level in a hierarchy implies
lower degrees at others’ [27, p.26].
9‘At intermediate stages of any transition, there is a group that has some properties of
an individual and some of a colony. the view that falls naturally out of this perspective is
that whether or not something is an organisms is vague - there are degrees of organismality,
corresponding to a group’s progress along a transition continuum’ [26, p.61].
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category, both non-living and living biological individuals. Examples of non-
living biological individuals are genes and viruses, belonging to the category of
Darwinian individuals, and ant colonies and beehives, belonging to the category
of organisms.
2.3 From Pluralism to Multiplicity
These categories function as a broad definition of biological individuality be-
cause any biological individual either is a Darwinian individual, an organism, or
both. Although this categorization allows for many different individuals there is
no set of reasonable necessary and jointly sufficient properties which individuate
every type of biological individual. No finite list of properties is able to function
as a suitable classification to construct every specimen in the entire biological
world. The lack of necessary and sufficient condition has led many philosophers
to believe that there simply is not just one kind of individuality but several dis-
tinct concepts of biological individuality. Jack Wilson sums it up nicely in his
work Biological Individuality by stating that ‘the assumption that there is only
one kind of individuality is as unjustified as the inference that an entity that
has some of these properties must have all of them.’ [34, p.56]. Due to the lack
of necessary and sufficient conditions Wilson opts for an ontological pluralism
concerning biological individuality. This idea agrees with the statement that
many kinds of biological individuals may be recognized by various biologists.
Wilson’s ontological pluralism contains the following six concepts of individ-
uality: particular, historical entity, functional individual, genetic individual,
developmental individual, and unit of evolution [34]. This conceptualization
proves to be very fruitful for many troubling cases involving some previous ex-
amples listed above and in the foregoing chapter. The grove of Aspen trees,
as stated earlier, may not be a clear instance of a separate thing but forms a
connected functional whole. The same goes for a spider hanging from a leaf by
its silk thread (which is genetically distinct from that leaf), or two people shak-
ing hands. According to Wilson this problem is easily solved by checking the
functionality condition stating that ‘a biological entity is a functional individual
if the parts from which it is composed are integrated into a functional organic
whole. A functional individual is composed of causally integrated heterogeneous
parts’ [34, p.89]. The work of Wilson will not be recapitulated here but does
form the inspiration for another conceptualization: a multiplicity of biological
individuality.
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2.3.1 Vertical Nesting
Arguing for a multiplicity of biological individuality does not deny pluralism. In
fact, it is compatible or maybe even complementary to pluralism but different
in the sense that the concept of multiplicity, set out here, puts the hierarchical
structure of the biological world central by focusing on part-whole relationships
between nested individuals. According to James Elwick it was Herbert Spencer
who first situated individuals in a hierarchy with individuals being able to be
part of larger individuals. Spencer created a hierarchy by introducing first-,
second-, and third-order individuals. In this way biological things could be
visualised as “compounded out of elementary structural elements, added sepa-
rately as first-order individuals; added in groups as second-order individuals; or
added in groups of groups as third-order individuals” [28, p.98].
In extension to this line of thought the relationship between individuals is
established by the hierarchy of the biological world itself. Instead of viewing
each and every biological individual in isolation it becomes possible to view each
biological individual as (a) part of a larger individual. This concept, of individu-
als constructing larger individuals, will be further referred to as vertical nesting.
Spencer’s definition of an individual, either a low “first-order” vertically nested
individual or an aggregate of such (second- or third-order), is characterized as
‘an organized and structured unit that is able to persist in its environment whilst
continuously distinguishing itself from its surroundings’ [28]. According to El-
wick this definition was further generalized by Spencer and he later described a
biological individual as ‘any organized unit capable of maintaining a “dynamic
equilibrium” between its internal and external environment’. Nowadays this
“dynamic equilibrium” is simply referred to as “homeostasis”.
Spencer did make a mistake, or at least has led himself astray, when he
tried to understand the degree to which vertically nested individuals kept their
autonomy whilst being part of a larger thing. Spencer put the emphasis on
lower nesting parts following their own “interest” [28]. For Spencer this made
sense since he wanted to switch back and forth between the physical order and
the social one but biologically this understanding is flawed. Consider a human
being who is an employee in a large organization. From a social perspective this
human being can be understood as being a nested individual integrated in a
larger body which is the entire organization. As an employee certain tasks need
to be fulfilled to benefit and safeguard the success (and hence the persistence
in time) of the organization. On the other hand the person we’re considering
also has interests of his or her own and these may be interests on which he
or she occasionally acts. Those interest do not necessarily have to benefit the
company. Now if we consider the cells that make up this person “acting on
their own interests” a mentalistic fallacy is made. There is no “will” of the
cells nor is there any conscious decision-making taking part at the level of the
22
cell. This intentional stance from the perspective of cells makes it seem as if
the idea of retaining autonomy on a low level is acceptable while in reality it
is not. In this example the only individual able to act on its own interest is
the employee. Besides vertical nesting there is another form of nesting that is
hardly ever mentioned: horizontal nesting.
2.3.2 Horizontal Nesting
Another phenomena of “nesting” is related to reproduction too but does not fo-
cus on “direct” parent-offspring lineages. Instead horizontal nesting introduces
phenomena that deviate from this standard (direct) way of thinking. These
phenomena involve more complicated life cycles that interfere with the stan-
dard idea of reproduction but are, nonetheless, a common biological feature.
It’s the biological process of alternation of generations.
Alternation of generations is the primary cause of horizontal nesting. It
is present in fungi, plants, and even some animals. In general the process of
alternation is part of a life cycle where genomes double and halve in size [31].
A classical case are ferns. Take the sporophyte for example, this is a regular
fern-shaped and diploid plant. By the process of meiosis sporophytes are able
to produce spores. Contrary to the sporophyte the spores have only one set
of chromosomes and will therefore grow into haploid plants. These haploid
plants, named gametophytes, function perfectly well but are clearly different
and distinguishable from the diploid sporophytes. The life cycle continues when
gametophytes produce their own ”spores” but now they are called gametes and
are not (cannot be) produced by meiosis. These gametes are sex cells and
are therefore either egg-cells or sperm-cells. When the sperm-cells swim to
the egg-cells and fuse together fertilization occurs. The fused sex cells will
eventually develop into a brand new sporophyte completing the life cycle. To
recapitulate: A diploid sporophyte asexually produces haploid spores that grow
into gametophytes. Then those gametophytes sexually produce sporophytes.
Note that this sporophyte-to-gametophyte transition is not just a metamor-
phosis. It is a different process. In case of an actual metamorphosis, like the
transition from caterpillar to butterfly, only one butterfly can originate from
one caterpillar. In general terms, only one B can occur from one A. In case
of the fern, however, many Bs can come from one single A and on top of that
many As can come from one single B as well. A further dissimilarity arises due
to the bottleneck stage through which the fern goes whereas a butterfly doesn’t
narrow down to a single cell during its transition from the caterpillar phase.
Passing through a single-cell bottleneck stage isn’t necessary for As to produce
Bs and/or Bs to produce As. For example, in the life cycle of one of the most
common jellyfish (the Scyphozoan jellyfish) two forms (medusa and polyp) al-
ternate between generations. The medusa creates sex cells from which polyps
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arise but polyps, on their turn, produce medusae in a multiplicative manner
without passing through a single-cell stage.
Focusing on the diploid fern-shaped plant again, imagine that dogs were all
clones and not distinguishable by sex. The dogs would produce something like
egg-cells and sperm-cells that grow into female and male horses, or mares and
stallions. The mares and stallions would be able to copulate and give birth to
same-sex dogs. Since both the dogs and the horses function as metabolic units
they are easily characterized as organisms. Reproductive success of the dogs
and horses depend on one another. It’s the entire life cycle that matters in
variation, heredity, and reproduction making it rather difficult to ”choose” the
Darwinian individual between dog and horse. Fortunately, there is no reason
not to interpret both dog, or sporophyte and horse, or gametophyte, to be two
organisms nested as one Darwinian individual.
2.4 Hierarchy of Nested Individuals
One thing has been purposely left out when describing vertically and horizon-
tally nested individuals: degrees of complexity. Here degrees of complexity
correspond to different levels of organization by means of vertical nesting. And
vertical nesting follows from the hierarchy of nested biological individuals. Note
that in biological individuals undergoing alternation of generations vertical nest-
ing is also apparent. This idea of vertical nesting inside horizontal nesting can
become complex on its own terms but that is not of importance here. The focus
lies on different levels of individuality.
What is meant by this is certainly not that some biological individuals are
more a biological individual than others. Any biological specimen is either an
individual or it is not. Depending on the measure of activity as well as the kind
of activity a biological individual displays, small individuals nested in others
might be dominated by the larger individual (which might be dominated by
yet a larger one, etc.) [35]. Whether a biological individual dominates or is
dominated by another individual depends on its activity in the organization of
the highest-order biological individual it is nested in.
For example, consider a human, a cell of the human, and a gene of the
human. Generally, the cell is dominated by the activity of the person and has
no will of its own.10 Its activity depends on the internal organization of its
surrounding cells which are all dependent on the (physical) state the human
is in. The level of activity of the humans’ cells depend on the activity of the
person, they demand less energy if the human is in rest, they burn a lot of energy
10Cancerous cells can be argued to not be dominated by the activity of the person. Also
Clarke argues collectives sometimes encourage (instead of suppress) evolutionary processes in
their integrated parts [36].
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when the human is active. If the person were to fall ill energy production goes
up as well. The point is that in this case the activity of the cells is dominated
by the higher-order biological individual. Intuitively it makes sense that lower-
order individuals are dominated by the higher-order individuals they are nested
in but this need not hold true for every case.
This is nicely captured by the interplay between “human” and “gene of the
human”. Richard Dawkins makes a great effort of making the gene central
in his book The Selfish Gene. He argues that “our bodies” are used by “our
genes” as mere vehicles. Our genes use our bodies as if they are nothing more
than survival machines. This view makes it seem as if there’s nothing more to
a person than his or her package of genes [37]. In many scientific disciplines
concerning biology it is useful to place the emphasis on the importance of genes
but this does not entail that genes are the only relevant players. We as “survival
machines” do in fact have the ability to influence the package of genes we carry.
The point here is that there is no center that instantiates linear causality but
rather a network causality [38]. The interplay between human and its genes
consists of both an upward and downward causation.
Besides degrees of complexity due to different levels of vertical nesting, an-
other thing follows from the hierarchy of nested biological individuals. Biological
individuals are partially characterized through their relations to other biolog-
ical individuals [35]. Perhaps this characterization holds for relations between
biological individuals in general but for now the focus lies on nested individuals.
The hierarchy is important to the biological individuality of each nested individ-
ual because the relations between them lock in their essential roles. This means
that the “individuality” of each biological individual is established through their
place in the organization composed by other biological individuals as well as the
relations it bears on the other individuals.
2.5 Recapitulation
Defining biological individuals as individuals that are living things, as Pradeu
suggested, fails for three reasons. First, there exist (living) biological individuals
that do not fit the criteria for individuality well. Second, there exist non-living
things that are biological individuals and third, a (strict) definition is most likely
to reject current and future living things as biological individuals event though
biologist might characterize them as such.
A descriptive definition of biological individuality is given that consist of
Darwinian individuals and organisms. This characterization includes both clear
and marginal specimens and includes most, if not all, of the specimens in the
biological world. The sets of Darwinian individuals and organisms are likely
to include all biological individuals put forward by competent biologists and
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embraces pluralism.
The notion of biological individuality put forward in this chapter argued for a
multiplicity of nested individuality. Nesting can be both vertical and horizontal
and match the hierarchical structure of the biological world. It also showed that
although higher-order biological individuals are capable of dominating lower-
order biological individuals there is both upward and downward causation. This
implies there is not one favored level of organization.
The hierarchical biological world is then represented by biological individu-
als which belong to the set of are Darwinian individuals, organisms, or both and
display different degrees of complexity. The display of different levels of com-
plexity depends on the biological individuals’ activity and its specific place in
a (large, multi-level) organization. This organization is constructed by vertical
and occasionally horizontal nested biological individuals. The stability of this
order is evident, as is the complexity, but in order to understand how biological
entities are alive the organizational order should be better understood.
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Chapter 3
Unpredictability, Stability,
and Entropy
A hierarchy of nested individuals portraying different degrees of complexity
raises the question where the first forms of complexity came from and how
current forms can be explained. These questions fuel, in part, the challenge of
constructing an interpretation of entropy that doesn’t contradict the description
of biological individuality. That construction is complicated because it cannot
lean too heavily on reductionism and because the notion of entropy is ambiguous.
What follows in this chapter is a technical and condensed story about or-
ganization. Where necessary, some concepts and processes of physics and bio-
chemistry will be discussed in a bit more detail. Analogies are included to get
the message across but are simplified examples of the real thing. The philo-
sophical aspects about biological individuality will be merged with the scientific
depiction of complex organization of viable entities near the end of this chapter
and continue in the next.
After having introduced the idea behind emergent properties I will discuss
the “power” of unpredictability. Emergent properties do not need prediction in
order to be explained and understood. Unpredictability is sometimes an inher-
ent property of nature. Physics knows three branches that deal with probability
instead of predictability, quantum mechanics, chaos theory, and statistical me-
chanics. These disciplines are briefly introduced to explain how a statistical
approach can give a reasonable understanding of a complex system without the
need to know every single detail.
The third topic covers different notions of entropy. Complex biological living
things are stable and highly ordered, and remain ordered. However, according to
physical laws everything should get only more and more disordered. According
to Erwin Schro¨dinger’s ideas put forward in his written lectures What is Life?
a statistical understanding of entropy shows that a stable state is still in accord
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with physical laws. However, his ideas are both promising in understanding
living things and at the same time show how our understanding remains limited.
Also the problem of all things moving towards thermodynamic equilibrium (the
biological equivalent of death) except for living things is examined.
3.1 Two approaches: Reductionism and Emer-
gentism
Subdividing a system in smaller parts and explaining the entire system solely
by its parts lies at the heart of a reductionist approach. It is undeniable that
reductionist strategies have been fruitful in the scientific enterprise but some-
times the whole cannot be properly explained by the mere sum of its parts. In
some cases natural phenomena require more than a detailed description of their
interacting parts because relevant aspects of the phenomena appear only at the
level of the whole system. The appropriate level of description that captures the
properties of the whole system cannot be found in its parts due to those con-
stituents parts lacking the properties being described. To list a few examples,
‘the properties of H2 and O2 do not allow us to predict the properties of H2O;
understanding the molecular properties of H2O does not allow us to derive the
Navier-Stokes equations; having the Navier-Stokes equations does not give us a
prediction and description of Benard cells’ [8].
In these examples properties (or substances) emanate from more basic entities
and cannot be subdivided with respect to those entities. Higher-level prop-
erties which are not reducible with respect to their parts are called emergent
properties [39][40]. Emergence contrasts reductionism in the sense that from
a reductionist perspective the whole can (and needs to) be explained solely by
the sum of its parts whilst from an emergentist’ viewpoint the whole is more
than the sum of its parts. It should be noted that nothing mystical is meant
by this for the properties can still be rationally explained, that is, without the
help of an unknown force. In other words: ‘Emergent properties provide the
recognition that nature can be creative while denying the occurrence of miracles
or inconsistencies’ [8].
There is another word that accounts for higher-order properties that are
caused by, though not present in, lower-level organization of parts: epiphe-
nomenon. Often the term “epiphenomenon” is defined along the lines of ‘a
secondary phenomenon that arises as a byproduct of a primary phenomenon’
[41]. It’s not particularly clear how the term “secondary phenomenon” and
“byproduct” should be interpreted but it cannot be taken to be completely sep-
arated from the “primary phenomenon”. A good example is Brownian motion,
the random motion of a non-organic particle in a liquid or gas. Without a proper
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understanding of what Brownian motion is it seems as if the particles move on
their own which is physically not possible. This mystery was solved by Einstein
and Brownian motion is now known to be the movement of non-organic parti-
cles in a liquid or gas due to the constant bombardment by atoms coming from
different directions. When the particle is hit on one side more often than any
other side the net force of the bombardment pushes the particle in a specific
though random direction. Brownian motion is a probabilistic process, a sec-
ondary phenomenon that arises as a byproduct of the random motion of other
particles and is one of the simplest emerging phenomena of interacting parti-
cles. It can be described as ‘a phenomenon that emerges independently from
the underlying phenomena that bring it about’ [42]. In this thesis “emergent”
and “epiphenomenal” are therefore taken to be synonymous.
Emergent phenomena are the result of descriptions of properties that refer
to real and often complex processes in nature. The trouble with these processes
is that they can often be explained but not predicted since they arise as “novel”
functions. Inability to predict a process does not mean that it is poorly under-
stood. In fact, unpredictability can itself be predicted as is the case in quantum
mechanics and chaos theory. Because unpredictability is of great importance in
dealing with emergentism it is wise to pay a little more attention to it.
3.2 Unpredictability
There are parallels between emergence and quantum mechanics, chaotic be-
haviour, and statistical mechanics: all involve unpredictability. With emer-
gence, (real) observers are unable to predict higher-level properties of complex
systems by studying the parts and their interactions that make up the whole
system. In case of quantum mechanics, a fundamental indeterminism forbids
us to gain knowledge about specific atomic events [43] and with chaos unpre-
dictable behaviour arises due to extreme sensitivity to initial conditions [8]. In
statistical mechanics there exist an inability to know the details of every par-
ticle’s trajectory. However, this lack of knowledge about the parts that make
up the system does not prevent us from making valuable statements about the
system as a whole.
Uncertainty can lead the way to a statistical interpretation of complex systems.
Especially in statistical physics interactions within a two-state system or be-
tween two separate systems can easily be described by calculating their most
likely macrostate instead of all independent microstates [44, p.59]. Apparent
characteristics of such macroscopic systems like temperature, energy fluctua-
tions, and stability can be derived without knowing the details of every mi-
crostate. The most likely macrostates are energetically more favourable and
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account for the static stability of the system(s) and although these systems are
non-living a similar path for living systems is reached but by means of a dynamic
stability.1 This dynamic stability will play a major role in constructing the idea
behind what makes living systems alive. This will be explained in detail below
but it is of importance to introduce another concept first, the notion of entropy.
On the one hand, dynamic stability is a form of a well organized system in
equilibrium. On the other hand, entropy tells us it’s most likely for a system
to become more disordered. This tension, between the likelihood of order and
disorder, needs to be addressed and solved.
3.3 Notions of Entropy
The concept of entropy has been linked to living things ever since the (writ-
ten) lectures of Erwin Schro¨dinger’s What is Life?. There exist, however, many
notions of entropy besides a statistical interpretation Schro¨dinger uses. There-
fore, using the expression “the” notion of entropy is already at fault. Here, the
problem of the ambiguous notion of entropy will be discussed as well as Erwin
Schro¨dinger’s interpretation in What is Life?.
The first to mathematically define “entropy” was Rudolf Clausius around
1850 and the formulation went through some transformations to finally become
how it is known now in science (although as a classical interpretation of entropy).
The first formulation described the transfer of heat from one body to another:
S =
Q
T
, ∆S = Q(
1
T2
− 1
T1
),
where S denotes entropy, Q denotes heat, and T denotes temperature. Later
Clausius would state that for every cyclical process the expression∫
δQ
T
≥ 0
would hold, even in an idealized system where an energy loss due to friction
could be excluded. He coined the term “entropy” and stated that ‘The entropy
of the world always strives towards a maximum’, which is now often cited as
the Second Law of Thermodynamics [45]. After this “classical” formulation of
entropy in thermodynamic physics other formulations are present nowadays in
statistical thermal physics and information theory. In these fields also different
1Imagine a fountain in a pond. If the fountain is turned off the pond is in equilibrium.
This equilibrium is static. If one were to make a picture of the pond at t = t1, t2, and t3 all
pictures would be similar whilst depicting the same water particles. If the fountain is turned
on and there is no loss of water the system is also in equilibrium. This equilibrium is said
to be dynamic. Now if one were to snap a picture of the pond at t* = t1*, t2*, and t3* the
pictures would be similar whilst depicting different water particles.
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formulations of the Second Law of Thermodynamics have sprouted.
Common thoughts about entropy include statements as ‘entropy always in-
creases’, ‘a system always tends towards a more disordered state’, ‘a system
is most likely to be found in its most probable macrostate’, ‘an ever increas-
ing measure of entropy determines the arrow of time’. All have been used at
one stage or another because a definition of thermodynamic entropy is difficult
to make precise and there are numerous ways to approach that. There is no
room for those strategies in this thesis but a detailed discussion can be found
in Uffink’s work [45].
The formulation put forward by Clausius did not make clear what entropy
is, only what a simple thermodynamic system does. In the 1870s Boltzmann
developed a statistical interpretation of entropy:
S = kbln(Ω)
with kb Boltzmann’s constant and Ω the number of microstates corresponding
to a specific macrostate. It paved the way for the study of systems comprised
of large numbers of particles and studying different interactions associated with
derivatives of entropy. Depending on the system of interest, notions of entropy
governed either interactions associated with energy and temperature, volume
and pressure, or particles and chemical potentials [46].
A statistical interpretation of entropy sometimes led to error whenever the
newly updated Second Law of Thermodynamics was treated as a fundamental
law. This is theoretically incorrect. It is a probabilistic notion which seems to
hold true in practice due to astronomically large numbers being fed into the
statistical formulation. The lower the number of states, the more incorrect it
tends to become. A second problem was the difficulty in understanding the
qualitative nature of evolved mathematical equations of entropy, such as:
S = kbN
(
3
2
ln
(
4pimUV 3/2
3h2oN
5/3
)
+
5
2
)
with N the number of gas particles, ho Planck’s constant, U equals internal
energy, and V denotes volume. This formula is an expression of entropy of a
pure classical monatomic ideal gas. Two qualitative arguments concerning the
dependence of S on m can give opposite results [46].
The ambiguity of the concept of entropy was not all bad as it was used in math-
ematics as a relatively flexible concept that could have multiple meanings [47].
In time the concept of entropy even found its way to information processing,
cosmology and economics. The first of these is worth pursuing as it may have
strong links with the question whether it can demonstrate the consistency of
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statistical mechanics. Both the probabilistic nature of entropy is questioned
as well as the validity of the Second Law of Thermodynamics that states that
entropy always increases.
First, when only partial information is available there still exist ways to
assign numerical values to probabilities. However, setting up rules or consistency
requirements to do so is subject to debate and controversy [48]. Part of the
problem is the meaning of probability itself. A more general statement of a
statistical notion of entropy regarding information is Shannon entropy:
H = −K
n∑
i=1
pilog(pi)
with K a positive constant and pi the probability of event i. In order to assign
numerical values to its probabilities constraints need to be set. Justification of
constraints, however, seems hard on the basis of partial information but there
are various ways to construct constraints from empirical data [49]. For example,
if one uses Boltzmann’s equation for entropy to describe the change in entropy
after a constraint on a specific variable is removed (e.g. removing a partition in
a box that contained an ideal gas on only one side of that partition) then one is
left with a number of microstates, Ω. After the moment the partition is lifted
but before an equilibrium state is reached, the probabilities corresponding to
each microstate are not (yet) equal to 1/Ω. In theory the assumption that all
microstates have the exact same probability could be false. That being said, the
overwhelming body of experimental data concerning states of systems indicates
that the assumption is extremely reasonable [44]. Exceptions in numerical values
of probabilities between microstates corresponding to a specific macrostate may
still be observed in the future but even if probabilities are shown not to be
equal the differences are “most likely” unable to influence outcomes of systems
composed of large numbers of particles. The practical side of systems being
composed of a large number of particles puts a strong constraint on assigning
numerical values to probabilities because the probabilities are defined as being
frequency dependent.
Second, validity of the mechanisms of statistical mechanics has been put to
the test by Maxwell’s Demon, Szilard’s engine [50], and Landauer’s principle.
The literature on this is extensive and touches upon many subjects but for the
sake of space in this thesis the focus will be on the relation between possible
ways to violate the Second Law of Thermodynamics by means of intervention.
The idea behind intervention in a predetermined thermodynamic system, either
by a demon, mechanism, intelligent being, or computational entity, is that with
certain knowledge about the system it is possible to decrease the entropy of
that system and violate the Second Law of Thermodynamics. It can be argued
that acquiring the necessary information about the system brings about an
32
entropic cost that more than offsets the decrease in entropy by utilizing that
information. In other words, a local decrease of entropy is possible as long as the
entire system (which includes the demon, intelligent being, etc.) still increases
the total entropy. Up to this day there are still problems with the combination
of knowledge and thermodynamic entropy [51].
The reason for stating this second problem relating to information and ther-
modynamic entropy is the possibility of locally decreasing entropy. This is what
Erwin Schro¨dinger called negentropy when he used the concept to describe order
in biological systems [52]. His interpretation and use of the concept of entropy
in biological systems is discussed below.
3.3.1 Schro¨dinger’s Interpretation of Entropy in Biologi-
cal Systems
Erwin Schro¨dinger set out to answer the questions about a physical and chemical
basis within living things in a series of lectures that were later published as What
is Life?. The actual question ‘What is Life?’ was changed and consisted of two
separate questions: “What is the physicochemical basis of heredity?” and “How
does order arise from disorder?”.
These two questions both strongly fused the development of molecular biol-
ogy and anticipated its ultimate explanatory inadequacy. Inspired by the first
question, the basis for heredity was conceptualized and later found to originate
from a lower level of organization. In the Central Dogma of molecular biol-
ogy it was thought that DNA was the master molecule and the only source of
information [53]. Causality was thought to be all upward from lower levels of
organization to higher ones. Plausible answers to the second question changed
this conceptualization and showed that levels of organization must be taken
seriously for new properties could emerge at each level of organization and in-
fluence lower ones. ‘This showed there was no privileged level of examination
or explanation’ [53].
Schro¨dinger’s efforts in answering how order could arise from disorder fo-
cused on the thermodynamics of living things. Schroo¨dinger’s answer was con-
structed to deal with the problem how living things could display order whilst
the Second Law of Thermodynamics stated that disorder always increases. Here
“disorder” does not relate to macroscopic properties of a system but to its spe-
cific microscopic description instead. Schro¨ dinger’s concept of entropy was
Boltzmann’s mathematical description and thus a statistical interpretation.
Although his work may have fused the development of molecular biology
his ideas also limited it. A close inspection of his work shows that plausible
answers to his two questions that should answer the bigger question ‘What is
Life?’ are paradoxical [53]. Also Schro¨dinger wondered if additional laws might
be necessary to explain life but did not found reasonable ground to support this
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any further [54]. Some even found his book unoriginal and claimed it contained
untrue statements, which could have been prevented if he hadn’t largely ignored
the science of chemistry [55].
Nevertheless, his idea about interpreting living things as thermodynamic
entities that locally reduce entropy in order to maintain and establish order
and prevent their decay could be fruitful in constructing an idea of complex
organization. If a move from chemistry to biology can be made by means of local
reduction of entropy, where entropy is considered to be a measure of disorder, it
may be possible to accept the conceptualization that levels of organization are
important.
3.4 Stability: Static and Dynamic
An energetically favourable state is a stable state and although it relies on the
system’s parts it is actually the whole system that is taken to be stable. In
case of a system consisting of a glass of water with a droplet of ink the stable
state will be the one where the ink molecules are evenly distributed through-
out the water. When a system is in such a static stable state it is said to be
in equilibrium, like a ball at rest at the bottom of a well. And even though
quantum mechanics accounts for some non-zero probability of deviating from
equilibrium (spontaneous formation of the ink droplet) the chances are so small
that in any real situation such chances can be ignored. In a biological context
the parts that eventually make up a stable system are the underlying chemical
reactions responsible for maintenance and organization of cells. These reactions
can produce stable states as well but are dynamic states instead of static ones.
This difference is subtle but important. Ink and water molecules bump into each
other but don’t react but various molecules present in even the smallest biolog-
ical systems do. Upon collision plenty of molecules are able to react if enzymes
are present to catalyze the reactions. However, even in a diverse molecular en-
vironment it is highly unlikely that the right reactants as well as the catalysts
(enzyme) for that particular reaction would meet. Some products, however, are
able to function as catalysts in their own formation and are formally known as
autocatalysts.2 The unlikeliness of the right reactants and catalysts is no issue in
case of an autocatalytic reaction since it is a self-sustaining system [6]. One such
system in particular is of great importance in living systems: self-replicating au-
tocatalytic molecules.
2A big difference between catalysis and autocatalysis, besides the use of products, is the
reaction rate between them. In the autocatalytic reaction, the rate of product formation
proceeds exponentially whilst the catalytic reaction only happens linearly. Autocatalysis will
therefore out-compete normal catalytic reactions almost instantly.
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A self-replicating molecule needs materials for its replication and because its
products have the ability to self-replicate, so too do they. If such a self-
replicating molecule were to replicate every minute then, within 3 hours, the
entire Earth’s mass would be consumed to sustain the replication processes.
Obviously this will not happen because the rate of production is balanced by
a corresponding rate of decay. This balance stabilizes the autocatalytic self-
replicating system but in a specific way. The stable state reached is not an
equilibrium state for that would be a thermodynamic equilibrium and corre-
sponds to death in a biological system [52]. The stable state is dynamic indi-
cating the products are formed and broken down in a continuous fashion and
kinetic in the sense that a high rate of production and low rate of decay adds
to the stability. Therefore no static stability occurs in living things but a dy-
namic kinetic stability originates [56]. This special kind of stability by entropy
of an autocatalytic self-replicating system is able to establish order from disor-
der without breaking The Second Law of Thermodynamics and is a key element
in the structural basis for complex organization.
3.5 Recapitulation
Many systems can be aptly characterized as merely the sum of its parts, but
some systems show higher-order properties at the level of the whole system that
are not present in its parts. Although emergent properties cannot be predicted
beforehand a lack of knowledge of a system’s parts and/or interactions does not
entail a lack of understanding of the whole.
In statistic mechanics it is possible to make sense of a system without de-
tailed knowledge about its many parts. Instead, a system’s macrostate(s) can
be calculated by determining the highest probability frequency of its number of
microstates. The probabilistic nature of a system’s macrostate tends to corre-
spond to the system’s most energetically favorable and stable configuration.
In any thermodynamic system a stable configuration increases (or increased)
entropy except in living systems. A statistical notion of entropy can be used to
explain this exception. Erwin Schro¨dinger used a statistical notion of entropy
to generate an idea he called negentropy to explain living systems as out-of-
equilibrium systems that locally decrease entropy. The entropy of the whole
system (the universe’s) still increases preventing a violation of the Second Law
of Thermodynamics.
A dynamically stable state on a molecular basis is a self-replicating auto-
catalytic system and functions as a first level of organization. A self-replicating
autocatalytic system forms a chemical basis from which a system can transition
towards a biological one. At this level of organization a response to selection
can occur, because it can out compete other catalytic systems. The system can
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therefore increase its complexity and express a dynamic and kinetic stability.
The next chapter will look at the autocatalytic system as a mechanism that
is able to locally decrease entropy and, over time, can develop further levels of
(complex) organization.
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Chapter 4
Bounded Complex
Organization in Biological
and Artificial Systems
To create a concept of life as an emergent property which originates from the
interplay between biological individuality and entropy two more ideas need to be
put forward. These are notions of contained organization by compartmentaliza-
tion and increased complexity by autocatalysis crossing a percolation threshold
and correspond to biological individuality and entropy, respectively.
The first thing explained in this chapter is that dynamic stability is possible
when things that make up the stability are bounded. A compartment (or vesicle)
allows for a local increase in stability and doesn’t undermine the notion of
entropy described above.
Section 4.2 contains a dense and slightly simplified idea about the emergence
of proto-metabolism inside a vesicle. The most important concepts in this sec-
tion are the rise of autocatalysis and especially the idea of an autocatalytic web
snapping into existence when a percolation threshold is crossed. It ends with
fusing the idea of emergent properties with the concept of a compartmental-
ized entity embodying a minimum degree of complexity. At the lowest level
of organization, where there exist a minimum degree of complexity, biological
individuality and entropy give rise to first signs of life.
The last sections of this chapter discuss interpretations of artificial life. The
prefix “biological” is briefly mentioned and the notion of substrate neutrality is
given attention.
37
4.1 Compartmentalization
Static stability is like water in a lake. If one were to shoot multiple pictures of
the lake with small delays between the photographs each picture would still show
the same lake built from the same water molecules. Dynamic kinetic stability
is like water in a mountain river and if one were to shoot multiple pictures of
the river each photograph would show the same stream of water but consisting
of different water molecules. Besides a form of stability the lake and the river
share another feature: they are both bounded. An autocatalytic self-replicating
entity is unable to function if it cannot acquire enough material for the rate
of formation to equal the rate of decay. There is a need for sufficient building
blocks and they have to be in close vicinity to each other for the entire system
to persist in time. The best way to ensure the autocatalytic self-replicating
entity is able to gather enough building blocks and sustain its reaction is to lock
everything up in a small space1 [58].
It is no coincidence that all life on Earth is cellular. Cells compartmentalize
their content with a semi-permeable membrane which allows for diffusion. The
cell membrane of selectively lets through building blocks and waste products
allowing for a dynamic and kinetic stable inner environment [59]. Still, com-
partmentalizing an autocatalytic self-replicating entity with a large amount of
building blocks may look like a cell but isn’t yet a living thing. Compartmental-
ization is one step closer to something we consider to be living but before such
a thing is reached both autocatalysis and self-replication need to be described
from a different, more realistic, perspective.
4.2 Birth of Life: a Hypothesis
Even in a pre-biotic world molecular diversity may be constrained by selection
[19]. Luckily, selection between compartments arises favouring crowded inner
environments over emptier ones [60]. Inside a crowded compartment different
molecules may function as catalysts in other molecules’ reaction(s) producing
yet other chemicals [61]. What happens next might be the most important
step in the transition from a non-living system to a living one. Instead of the
production of one single autocatalyst a variety of molecules and their reactions
produce several autocatalysts creating a giant autocatalytic web. One large
interconnected system forming a closed complex autocatalytic set appears at a
critical value when moving from order to chaos. This will be illustrated with
1“To be an entity, distinguished from the environment, requires a barrier to free diffusion.
The necessity of thermodynamically isolating a subsystem is an irreducible condition of life.
[...] It is the closure of an amphiphilic bilayer membrane into a vesicle that represents discrete
transition from nonlife to life” [57, p.8].
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the example below. Complexity starts to increase as a (large) compartment
becomes more crowded.2 As the number of (diverse) chemicals within the com-
partment rises more reactions become possible and eventually a point is reached
at which an autocatalytic system snaps into existence [63]. This process is easily
visualized by the following thought experiment.
Consider a thousand light bulbs all randomly distributed on a floor. Initially
all light bulbs are isolated and switched off but if a light bulb is connected to at
least one other light bulb it is switched on. Light bulbs are connected by ran-
domly choosing two and putting a simple wire between them. The goal of the
experiment is to find the number of wires to get all light bulbs connected and
burning. In the first stage of the experiment it’s most likely two non-burning
light bulbs will get connected. After a while chances become relatively large
non-burning light bulbs get connected to burning ones leading to the rise of
large clusters. As the ratio of wires to light bulbs continues to increase and
passes 0.5 a sudden transition occurs where almost all large clusters get con-
nected to each other and the entire floor is almost entire lid up by burning light
bulbs. After this transition only a few more non-burning light bulbs need to
get connected.3 It might take a long time to get all light bulbs in the on-state
because many light bulbs will get connected which are already on.
The actual result of the experiment is not of importance but what happens
halfway through the experiment is. As the ratio of wires to light bulbs passes
(roughly) 0.5 a phase transition occurs where the size of the largest cluster of
burning light bulbs suddenly jumps from just under 150 to well over 800 -4,
see figure 4.1. The threshold for the critical ratio of wires to light bulbs giv-
ing rise to the phase transition is called the percolation threshold and is used in
various mathematical models describing complicated systems and networks [64].
Lightbulbs and wires don’t interact but molecules do. The diversity of molecules
increases not only by different substances of building blocks but by difference in
length as well. Through ligation and cleavage the molecular diversity increases
slowly as does the number of reactions between them. As soon as the ratio
of reactions to molecules reaches a critical point and crosses the percolation
2A way to increase molecular complexity is for one to bring together more enzymes and
nucleic acids, or more enzyme species in order to induce, in principle, a metabolic cycle [62,
p.232].
3The chance to select non-burning light bulbs with the first wire is 1 (since all are off at
the start of the experiment). Connecting the last light bulb only has a 1
1000
= 0.1% chance
of getting lit.
4As the number of light bulbs reaches infinity the transition becomes discontinuous. In
the example the jump from 150 to 800 will follow an S-shaped curve but will approximate a
step-function with an increasing number of light bulbs.
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Figure 4.1: Schematic drawing of a phase transition were the number of total
light bulbs (nodes) shows a steep increase as the ratio of (Wires/Bulbs), or
(Edges/Nodes), exceeds 0.5. Image (modulated) from [63, p.57].
threshold an autocatalytic system suddenly jumps into existence. Every “new”
molecule adds to “crowdedness” and leads to (new) possible reactions within the
compartment. This makes it more complex but not yet functional. However,
after the percolation threshold is crossed a self-sustaining entity arises giving
rise to higher-order properties [6][64]. The addition of complexity is quantized
in terms of molecules and the reactions between them. First in terms of an ever
more crowded compartment, second in terms of a higher diversity of molecules
and possible reactions, and third in terms of functionality after the autocatalytic
system occurred.
A closed autocatalytic set with simple molecules can display stunning order
without violating any law of physics. Although the order inside a compartment
shows a local decrease of entropy the entire system, consisting of the inside and
outside environment of the the “cell”, shows an increase in entropy [52]. It’s like
someone gluing a broken piece of china back together, partly restoring order but
using so much physical energy for the local decrease of entropy that the total
amount of disorder still increases. The order inside the compartment gives rise
to complex phenomena eventually leading to emergent properties [65].
Complexity increases until a functional autocatalytic system occurs, which hap-
pens due to a local decrease in entropy. This will be the base level of complexity
necessary to allow for the rise of emergent properties. Examples of such proper-
ties are increased functionality (diversified replicate system), complex structure
(stable double layered cell membrane), catalytic efficiency (effective energy con-
sumption and waste segregation), evolvability, etc. Once a compartmentalized
proto-metabolic unit emerges, evolution by natural selection is able to drive its
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increased complexity further due to the existence of a ground level organization
at which a response to selection can occur. I argue that the meaning of “evolv-
ing increased complexity” is about creating new levels of organization at which
(pre-)biotic entities can be active. By establishing their place in the (internal)
organization composed by other pre-biotic entities the first signs of nested indi-
viduality can appear. These nested individuals show signs or display properties
which may be attributed to living things [57].
From a scientific point of view the scenario described in the paragraph above
is speculative. The reason for this is that there has not (yet) been scientific
success regarding the transition from proto-cell to biological living individual,
in other words making a proto-cell viable. It’s currently not experimentally
feasible to create enough molecular diversity inside a small vesicle (such as a
(one-layered) lipid) or to establish a phase transition into an autocatalytic web
in vivo. At this moment the focus lies on self-replication and building stable
vesicles. It seems hard to move from a vesicle containing a pre-biotic look-a-like
replicate system (genes) and increase its complexity in a stable fashion. This is
not yet scientifically understood. Philosophically, however, there might be an
idea why this transition is hard to establish and that idea has to do with genes
as information bearers.
4.3 Artificial Life
How do we move from a vesicle containing what is believed to be the bear min-
imum number of materials needed for self-replication and maintenance to an
entity that can be claimed to be viable? A possible answer to this question
follows below. Furthermore, life in silico is discussed in the remainder of this
chapter. Here life within a digital domain and robotic life are shortly men-
tioned. And a link is made between substrate-neutrality and living biological
individuals.
4.3.1 Genetic “Genes”
Self-replication needs a template and enough material to operate successfully.
This is known from present-day examples such as RNA and DNA. However, the
most valuable feature of successful, e.g. errorless, replication is conservation of
genetic information. Contrary to previous beliefs the genetic code is a product
of the living world and may have come later as it functioned for more efficient
reproduction of already living things [66]. A self-replicating molecule is not, in
and of itself, genetic, even if it has the potential to become an information bearer
in a later stage of its existence. It will become genetic ‘only if it is placed in a
network of relations associating it with various intracellular functions’ [66, p.19].
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A variety of functions is produced by molecular diversity which originates from
copying errors and/or other chemical reactions. In fact, the rise of molecular
diversity is key in creating a network suitable for a self-replicating entity to
become an informational element, or “genetic”. In and of itself, self-replication
is not able to make a molecule a genetic entity because it doesn’t necessarily
have the capacity to produce the (emergent) properties of a cell that contains it.
Before a particular molecule becomes an information bearer it needs to allow for
a high number of interactions. The better a molecule is at “holding” information
the more resilient it must be to change, for changing the molecule causes loss
of information. The higher the resilience the lower its interactions. So either
information is kept and interactions stunned or interactions are abundant but
information is lost.
On top of this problem an information bearer needs machinery to transcribe
and translate the information it contains. On the other hand, the biological
machinery to execute transcription and translation needs to be produced. The
production, however, relies on reading the information of the information bearer.
So both information bearer and biological machinery to read the information
need to exist simultaneously.
4.3.2 Non-Biological Life
Chapter 3 briefly mentioned the inability to experimentally create a phase tran-
sition where a large number of molecules snap into an autocatalytic functioning
web in vivo. The term in vivo is of importance. Testing the conditions un-
der which the percolation threshold is crossed is with today’s computing power
easily done in silico. Computer technology is often used to gain understand-
ing of the interactions within (or between) living things by translating that
behaviour into a digital world. Synthesizing life in artificial media makes it pos-
sible to ‘develop practical applications involving new technologies that exploit
intuitions and methods it takes from living systems’ [67, p.395]. The synthesis
of life can be done by either creating a living world within digital boundaries or
by introducing robots (or “robotic life”) into the real biological world.
Robots function mainly by regulation of a control center. Sometimes several
control units work in parallel but there always remain cores or centres of control.
This is characteristically non-biological, where the accumulated interactions of
many things work together. No one specific location is solely responsible for
all activity. Living worlds inside digital domains are at least as far from the
real deal as robotic life is. Artificial life does not represent biological systems
but is, nonetheless, exceptionally suitable to generate simple instances of lifelike
phenomena [67, p.396].
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4.4 Substrate Neutrality
The strongest claim of artificial life researchers is the expectation that many of
the most fundamental features of the evolution of life on Earth will be shown
to be independent of the physical media that happen to embody the process
[67, p.397]. I argue that this is wrong. The embodied process is the very thing
realized by internal organization of and relations between the parts that make
up living biological individuals. Putting the focus on the “process” is valid but
the claim that this is independent of the physical media is not.
In chapter 1 it was shown that not every interaction between physical matter
is possible. For example, atoms have a predefined number of electrons they can
carry in each shell. The number of electrons per shell is bounded by physical laws
causing quantized energy levels between them. Atoms are therefore bounded
in their interactions based on the favorability of the energy exchange between
them. Some atoms bind better or more likely to some than to others. Some
are more likely to share electrons than others are. This is a consequence of the
fabric of nature.
The possibilities to create biological life are limited (or bounded) in the same
respect. Interaction of entities depends on the very nature of those entities.
Biological building blocks, even in their inanimate form, are able to interact in
a wide variety of ways but due to their nature this variety is not limitless. Some
building blocks are more likely to interact than others shaping further levels
of organization and complexity later on. Organization and relations between
entities rely on the nature of those entities. Due to the “nature of nature”
life is inherently bounded. Those entities that are able to interact in such a
way as to eventually produce and later on influence life will come to carry the
prefix “biological”. Biological individuals and life are intertwined by the vast
but limited possibilities of interacting matter. The interactions underlying this
entanglement, e.g. an autocatalytic web inside a compartment or an autopoietic
system consisting of aggregates of cells, can be described by the concepts of
biological individuality and statistical thermodynamic entropy put forward in
the previous chapters.
Although some biological individuals are argued not to be living, such as
genes, they do carry the prefix biological. I argue, however, that this is ap-
plicable only after they become part of an entity which has sufficient levels of
organization to bring about emergent properties. Because only then their role in
the total organization will be established by means of the relations with other
(biological) entities. Only after a base level of complexity within a vesicle is
crossed do we speak of viable vesicles, or cells [68]. When taken out of existence
a unique cell has ceased to exist, when recreated another unique cell (different
from the first one) will have arisen. Any stage before that a “protocell” remains
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non-biological.
4.5 Recapitulation
Compartmentalization contains but does not isolate an autocatalytic system
and allows for it to maintain and develop itself. A self-replicating autocatalytic
web snaps into existence when the ratio between molecular species and reactions
between them reaches a percolation threshold. Once the threshold is crossed a
phase transition occurs that produces a dynamic and kinetically stable system
that is able to locally decrease entropy.
Increasing complexity of the system creates new levels of organization at
which a response to selection can occur. What starts as a non-living crowded
vesicle transitions into a protocell that leads the way to the first biological
individual. A further increase in complexity produces emergent properties such
as improved functionality, structure, and catalytic efficiency. Besides single
cells containing a self-replicating autocatalytic web that drives a local decrease
in entropy a collective of cells embodies a autopoietic system that can do the
same.
Complex levels of organization eventually depend on a molecule (or several)
that can function as information bearers for the entire system. However, this
relies on the (molecular) organization as a whole.
Life-like phenomenon can be digitally expressed but are different from bio-
logical life due to a center of control and a lack of interaction or dependence on
its environment. Also, biological life was shown to be limited by the number of
interactions possible by nature. This restriction is unlikely, if not impossible, to
overcome for artificial life and will therefore always be different from biological
life.
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Conclusion
From chapter 1 we know it is hard to define individuality. We used Pradeu’s
definition of individuality to understand were problems of defining individuality
originate from. The chapter showed that there exist individual things that
do not satisfy all criteria very well. The criteria listed by Pradeu’s definition
fitted well with natural kinds, such as atoms, but sometimes poorly with living
things. Living things are not always clearly separated, they change through time
and were argued to have boundaries that are dependent upon the observer’s
satisfaction.
Chapter 2 showed that a definition of biological individuality as individu-
als that are living things displayed similar problems. There exist examples of
biological individuals that are living things but do not satisfy all criteria of
individuality and examples of biological individuals that are not alive. These
problems were solved by constructing a descriptive definition of biological indi-
viduality that is the union of the sets of Darwinian individuals and organisms.
This categorization embraces pluralism and contains all levels of organization at
which a response to selection can occur. Both Darwinian individuals and organ-
isms contain clear and more marginal cases due to reproduction and evolution.
This construction matches a hierarchy of nested individuals, both vertically and
horizontally, spanning the full biological world. Nested biological individuals are
argued to rely on their place inside a larger organization and the relations they
have with other individuals. No level of organization is favored over another
and each level displays a specific form of activity leading to different levels of
complexity within any nested biological individual.
Chapter 3 explained that emergent properties arise due to the parts of a
system producing novel functions at higher levels of organization that could
not have been predicted beforehand. A lack of predictability does not mean a
system is poorly understood and a macrostate of a system can still be known
without knowledge about the details of each and every microstate. Such a
macrostate is often a stable state in a thermodynamic system and refers to
its energetically most favorable state where entropy has increased the most.
Living systems, however, show a decrease in entropy but Erwin Schro¨dinger
showed that by using of a statistical notion of entropy it is possible for a system
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to locally decrease entropy whilst increasing the entropy of the total system.
This explanation shows that living systems do not violate the Second Law of
Thermodynamics.
Chapter 4 explained, besides the complexity, the stability of living things.
A dynamic kinetic stable system is represented by a self-replicating autocat-
alytic system that is contained within a compartment but not isolated from its
environment. A compartmentalized entity harboring a high degree of various
interacting molecules is able to cross a percolation threshold in order to snap an
autocatalytic web into existence that further drives a local decrease in entropy.
Crossing a minimal degree of complexity will allow for emergent properties to
arise which, at the same time, instantiate the first biological individual. Bio-
logical individuality and entropy meet for the first time at the lowest level of
organization and relate to a minimal level of complexity while maintaining its
internal order. The first living biological individual then is a cell and the chap-
ter argued that from that point on the prefix biological may also be used for
whatever system fulfills a distinctive role inside that organization of the whole
(such as genes as information bearers). Our efforts in trying to represent life in
different media will not work but are capable of broadening our understanding
of it. The reason it will not work in different media is that life in silico is con-
structed in such a way that it favours a level of organization which localizes a
center of control and lacks interaction with the environment. In addition, the
nature of the physical media restricts the interactions of and relations between
matter.
The idea of biological individuality put forward in this thesis embraces pluralism
and is therefore in disagreement with other notions of biological individuality
that endorse monism. De Sousa would disagree with the notion of biological
individuality of this thesis and argues that ‘In the light of bizarre cases, we
have a choice between insisting on a weak criterion of individuality that will
fit the entire gamut of biological diversity, and a strong one which will exclude
most living things. The second view, I [De Sousa] will argue, casts the clearer
light on the living world as a whole and on ourselves in particular’ [69, p.196].
It seems contradictory to me to exclude most living things in order to shed a
clearer light on the living world. The problem of a monoistic interpretation of
individuality is, I believe, besides excluding current borderline cases, there may
be many undiscovered or evolving biological individuals that we will want to
interpret as biological individuals in the near future. A second objection I have
against De Sousa’s view is making human beings a central focus of attention.
In the biological world human beings are just another form of life and are not
more a biological individual than other things in the biological world.
Another categorization of biological individuality has been put forward by R.
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Wilson in his book Genes and the Agents of Life. The Individual in the Fragile
Sciences. Wilson’s idea was not analysed in this thesis, because it cannot be
squared with the rise of emergent properties. Wilson rethinks the place the in-
dividual has in biology and takes agents to be individuals [70, p.7]. He includes
species, organisms, and genes as being agents of life. This is still in alignment
with the main direction of chapter 2 but Wilson’s characterization of agency is
where it becomes problematic. He states: “I intend to characterize an agent in
quite a general way: an agent is an individual entity that is a locus of causation
or action.” [70, p.6]. This characterization does not fit with emergent properties
which may constitute organization without a pre-defined locus of causation.
The idea of life as an emergent property does not fit well in scientific branches
that approach life from a merely reductionist point of view. In this thesis I
already made a case for involving emergentism but I like to stress that this is
not necessarily a common strategy in research about cellular dynamics, origin of
life, or constructing minimal cells. However, systems biology becomes more ap-
parent in these branches and does embrace a holistic interpretation of biological
systems.
Besides arguing for emergentism I stated that the nature of interactions of
organic material is not the same as the nature of the interactions of inorganic
material and that therefore emergent properties would be different. One might
object to this and say it could be possible that different interactions may create
similar emergent properties we might come to conceptualize as life. My critique
on this, however, is that no evidence exist (in systems biology) that would
support that hypothesis.
The idea of life as an emergent property is, for the most part, in agreement
with Bruce Weber’s interpretation of life. Weber argues for the importance of
understanding the origin of life to better understand what life is [71]. In doing
so he focuses his attention on the part Schro¨dinger was claimed to have left out,
giving attention to a chemical basis as a step prior to biological systems. Weber
also states that understanding information signalling and interpretation will
help explain the emergence of life [72][73]. What I do not agree on with Weber
is his need for additional laws in order to define emergent complexity [73][74].
Weber opts for additional laws after he recognizes three different strengths or
forms of emergence. In my opinion, this complicates an already complex subject
even further without any evidence suggesting there should be new laws. Just as
in Schro¨dinger’s case Weber’s wonder if additional laws might be necessary to
explain life do not seem to find reasonable ground for further support.
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